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A significant portion of the funds invested in the modern securi-
ties market is derived from the assets of various types of trust ac-
counts.' Professional trustees such as banks and investment firms,
due to their expertise, have played a large role in managing these
trust investments.2 Despite their particular skill and knowledge in
handling investments, professional fiduciaries in New York are not
held to a higher standard of care and responsibility than nonexpert
trustees. 3 New York's use of a single standard for both the profes-
sional and layman trustee is difficult to justify, especially in light
of the fact that other professionals are required to exercise a greater
degree of care than laymen in matters of judgment or suffer costly
consequences.4
* Surrogate, Surrogates Court, Queens County, New York.
See, e.g., J. COHEN & E. ZINBARG, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLO MANAGEMENT
662-731 (1967). See also P. HARBRECHT, PENSION FUNDS AND ECONOMIC POWER 23-29 (1959);
D. VAUGHN, SURVEY OF INVESTMENTS 492-96 (2d ed. 1974).
A trust is an arrangement under which a fiduciary holds legal title to property subject
to an obligation to keep or use the property for the benefit of one or more other persons.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959). The trustee manages the trust according to the
dictates of the trust instrument, id. §§ 3(3), 164(a), which often expressly empowers him to
produce income by making investments. If a trustee exceeds the limits of his authority, his
acts may be void. G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 551 (2d ed. 1960). In general, the
fiduciary is required to exercise prudence and reason in managing the trust. Id. § 612.
2 By the 19th century, corporations had been empowered to administer trusts. There-
after, banks increasingly undertook the management of trust accounts, while many trust
companies began to engage in banking. 2 A. ScoTT, TRUSTS § 96.5 (3d ed. 1967).
Personal trust departments of trust companies and commercial banks apparently man-
age larger investment portfolios than all other financial institutions combined. Institutional
Investors and Corporate Stock-A Background Study 66-68 (R. Goldsmith ed. 1973). It has
been stated, however, that their share of the investment market is shrinking. See id. at 68.
See generally id. at 66-71, 253-56; Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Friedman].
3 In re Pate's Estate, 84 N.Y.S.2d 853, 868 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1948), aff'd mer., 276
App. Div. 1008, 95 N.Y.S.2d 903 (1st Dep't 1950); see, e.g., In re Bank of N.Y., 35 N.Y.2d
512, 518-19, 323 N.E.2d 700, 704, 364 N.Y.S.2d 164, 169 (1974); In re Fulton Trust Co., 257
N.Y. 132, 136-137, 177 N.E. 397, 398 (1931); In re Union Trust Co., 219 N.Y. 514, 521, 114
N.E. 1057, 1059 (1916); Cobb v. Gramatan Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 261 App. Div. 1086, 1086,
26 N.Y.S.2d 917, 919 (2d Dep't 1941) (mem.); In re City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 189 Misc.
942, 945, 68 N.Y.S.2d 43, 46 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959).
4 See, e.g., Toth v. Community Hosp., 22 N.Y.2d 255, 262, 239 N.E.2d 368, 372, 292
N.Y.S.2d 440, 447 (1968); note 54 and accompanying text infra. See generally Kaplin,
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This Article will discuss the standard of care owed by corporate
or professional fiduciaries under New York law. After an examina-
tion of the current status of the law, it will be argued that New York
should opt for criteria which demand greater investment care from
a corporate trustee.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Fiduciaries generally need not display infallibility nor presci-
ence in making investment decisions;- they are required to act in
good faith and exercise "such diligence and such prudence in the
care and management [of the fund] as in general, prudent men of
discretion and intelligence . ..employ in their own like affairs." 6
This "prudent man" rule was formulated in an 1830 Massachusetts
case, Harvard College v. Amory. 7 There, an action was brought by
the remaindermen of a testamentary trust who contended that the
trustees had invested in corporate stocks which were financially
hazardous.8 Finding that the trustees had acted with skill and dis-
cretion,9 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held the
stock purchases to be proper.10 By way of dicta, the court observed:
Professional Power and Judicial Review: The Health Professions, 44 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 710
(1976); Stewart, Tightening Legal Constraints on Professionals, 7 N.C. CENT. L.J. 271 (1976);
COMMENT, The Washington Consumer Protection Act vs. The Learned Professional, 10 GONZ.
L. REv. 435 (1975).
Interestingly enough, in the securities regulation area recent attempts have been made
to expand significantly the liability of brokers, accountants, and lawyers. See, e.g., Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (accountants); SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 96,027 (D.D.C. May 2, 1977)
(lawyers).
I In re Bank of N.Y., 35 N.Y.2d 512, 519, 323 N.E.2d 700, 704, 364 N.Y.S.2d 164, 169
(1974); In re Hubbell, 302 N.Y. 246, 257, 97 N.E.2d 888, 893 (1951); see In re Estate of
Heidenreich, 85 Misc. 2d 135, 138, 378 N.Y.S.2d 982, 985 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1976).
1 In re Bank of N. Y., 35 N.Y.2d 512, 518-19, 323 N.E.2d 700, 704, 364 N.Y.S.2d 164,
169 (1974) (quoting In re Fulton Trust Co., 257 N.Y. 132, 136, 177 N.E. 397, 398 (1931));
Costello v. Costello, 209 N.Y. 252, 261, 103 N.E. 148, 152 (1913); King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76,
85-86 (1869); see N.Y. EST., PowFmS & TRusTs LAw § 11-2.2 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977).
7 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1831).
Id. at 451-52, 455-56. The decedent had provided by will for the establishment of a trust
producing income for his spouse. Upon his wife's death, the remainder of the trust was to be
divided equally between Harvard College and Massachusetts General Hospital. Id. at 446-
47. Approximately one-half of the trust consisted of stock issued by two manufacturing
companies. The remaining portion of the fund was made up of shares in a bank and an
insurance company. Id. at 449. By October 1828, the book value of the manufacturing stock
had decreased almost 30%. Id. at 450.
1 See id. at 463-65. The court indicated that a trustee should not be held liable unless
his conduct rises to the level of "gross neglect and wilful mismanagement." Id. at 461.
,1 Id. at 463.
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All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall
conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is
to observe how men of prudence, discretion and intelligence man-
age their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to
the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable
income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be in-
vested."
This statement has been accepted by courts12 and commentators 3
alike as the rule of law by which the actions of fiduciaries are
judged.
A number of years after this landmark decision, the New York
Court of Appeals, in King v. Talbot," adopted the prudent man rule
as the criterion governing fiduciary investments in New York. Point-
ing to the Harvard College case with approval, 5 the King court
" Id. at 461 (footnote omitted).
12 See, e.g., Whittemore v. United States, 383 F.2d 824, 835 n.25 (8th Cir. 1967); Doss v.
United States, 326 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (N.D. Tex. 1971) (prudent man standard incorporated
into Texas statute); Steiner v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 47 Haw. 548, 561-62, 393 P.2d 96, 104-
05 (1964) (codification of prudent man standard); O'Brien v. Dwight, 363 Mass. 256, 294, 294
N.E.2d 363, 385 (1973); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Price, 11 N.J. 90, 93-96, 93 A.2d 321, 322-
23 (1952) (prudent man standard adopted by New Jersey statute); Sheets v. J.G. Flynt
Tobacco Co., 195 N.C. 149, 152-53, 141 S.E. 355, 357 (1928); Estate of Stetson, 463 Pa. 64,
74 n.4, 345 A.2d 679, 684 n.4 (1975) (prudent man standard contained in Pennsylvania
statute).
" See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 2, at 551-54; Scott, The Law of Trusts, 1941-1945, 59
HARv. L. REv. 157, 180 (1945); Ward & Shockney, The Texas Trust Act: Investment Power
of a Trustee, 37 TEx. L. REv. 66, 68-72 (1958).
14 40 N.Y. 76 (1869).
'5 The prudent man standard adopted in King differed significantly from the rule set
forth in Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1831). Judge Woodruff, writing
for the King court, agreed with the Harvard College decision that the trust fund should be
kept secure and productive, but added a requirement that "the fund ... always be subject
to future recall for the benefit of the cestui que trust." Id. at 88. As a result, bank, insurance,
and other private stocks were excluded from the class of prudent investments. Id. One
commentator has observed that this additional requirement of recallability resulted in New
York's eventual adoption of the legal list. See 9C P. RoHAN, NEw YORK CIVIL PRAcMCE 11-
2.2[41, at 11-427 to -428 & n.65 (1977) [hereinafter cited as RoHAN]. For a discussion of the
legal list see notes 21-27 and accompanying text infra.
The recallability requirement in King seems to have been prompted by several factors.
In the late 1860's, when the King case was decided, government bonds were readily available
and sold at high premiums, in contrast to their depreciated value at the time of the Harvard
College decision. This may have led to the King court's belief that nongovernmental securities
are more uncertain than those issued by the government. See 40 N.Y. at 88-89. The court
apparently had little doubt that the government bonds would retain their value and continue
to be a productive and safe means of trust investment. In addition, the trust in Harvard Col-
lege was a dynastic trust, designed to be perpetuated for as long as possible, whereas the
King decision concerned a caretaker trust, which is primarily income producing and usually
requires greater liquidity than a dynastic trust. Friedman, supra note 2, -at 556. This would
seem to have further influenced Judge Woodruff's conclusion that the fund "should always
be subject to future recall." 40 N.Y. at 88.
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stated that "the just and true rule is, that the trustee is bound to
employ such diligence and such prudence. . . as. . . prudent men
of discretion and intelligence . . . employ in their own like af-
fairs."'" The Court of Appeals stressed that a trustee is under a duty
to act in accordance with the objectives of a trust; therefore, he must
endeavor to preserve the corpus and produce a reasonable income."
Consequently, the court warned that speculative investments would
not be tolerated. 8
After the acceptance of the prudent man rule by the courts,"
the New York Legislature limited the investment discretion of trus-
tees, apparently in an attempt to protect trust beneficiaries." At the
turn of the century, the legislature passed the fiduciary investment
act permitting trustees to invest only in bonds or stocks issued by
New York cities. 2' This statute was the original "legal list ' 22 of per-
missible fiduciary investments. 23 Until 1950,24 the legal. list had
11 40 N.Y. at 85-86.
,, Id. at 86.
18 Id. The court proscribed "all speculation, all investments [for] an uncertain and
doubtful rise in the market, and, of course, everything that does not take into view the nature
and object of the trust, and the consequences of a mistake in the selection of the investment
to be made." Id.
,1 Augmenting the prudent man rule are certain judicially-created principles designed
to prevent improper actions on the part of the trustee. Thus, the trustee may not invest trust
funds to produce a profit for himself. 3 WARREN'S HEATON PROCEDURE AND LAW OF SURROGATE'S
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YOaK § 264, 3, at 47-9 (0. Warren & G. Markuson 6th ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as WARREN'S HEATON]. Similarly, self-dealing, In re Title Guar. & Trust
Co., 291 N.Y. 376, 52 N.E.2d 909 (1943), and investing in anticipation of an uncertain or
doubtful rise in the market are proscribed. In re Barrett's Estate, 82 N.Y.S.2d 137, 144 (Sur.
Ct. Westchester County 1948).
20 Due to the development of a legal list by 1914, see notes 21 & 22 and accompanying
text infra, the courts had little opportunity to label specific investments prudent or impru-
dent. Instead, the judiciary developed certain principles to supplement the legal list. See,
e.g., 2 E. FINGAR, D. BOOKSTAVER & J. MCQUAID, NEW YORK WILLS AND TRUSTS § 12.09 (rev.
2d ed. 1976).
A trustee's authority to invest was no greater than that provided by the instrument
establishing the trust. On the other hand, the trust instrument could have permitted the
trustee to invest in securities not included on the legal list. See In re Doelger, 254 App. Div.
178, 183, 4 N.Y.S.2d 334, 339 (1st Dep't), afl'd, 279 N.Y. 646, 18 N.E.2d 42 (1938); N.Y. EST.,
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.2(a)(1) (McKinney 1967); 3 WARREN'S HEATON, supra note 19,
§ 266, 2.
21 Ch. 65, § 1, [1889] N.Y. Laws 63.
22 Many jurisdictions have passed legislation to regulate the investment of trust funds
in securities. When such legislation clearly prescribes specific permissible investments it
takes on the appearance of a list, and therefore is referred to as the "legal list." See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227, Comment p (1959).
23 A fiduciary did not satisfy his obligations confining his investments to those securities
contained on the legal list. The trustee was required to use care, skill, and caution in making
an investment, even when the particular security purchased was present on the list. Delafield
CORPORATE FIDUCIARIES
been composed generally of fixed income securities such as federal,
state, and municipal obligations and bonds and mortgages on real
property. 25 It was then qualitatively revised to authorize the pur-
v. Barret, 270 N.Y. 43, 48-49, 200 N.E. 67, 68-69 (1936); In re City Bank Farmers Trust Co.,
189 Misc. 942, 946, 68 N.Y.S.2d 43, 47 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947); In re Doyle, 191 Misc.
860, 862, 79 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1948).
24 Prior to 1950, the legal list was periodically revised and recodified. See, e.g., ch. 417,
§ 9, (18971 N.Y. Laws 510 (consolidation into Personal Property Law); ch. 295, § 1, [1902]
N.Y. Laws 852 (fiduciaries authorized to invest in those securities in which savings banks
could invest); ch. 369, § 239, [1914] N.Y. Laws 1379 (consolidation into Banking Law); ch.
448, § 2, [1928] N.Y. Laws 983 (authorization to invest in securities of gas, telephone, and
electric utilities); ch. 352, § 1, [1938] N.Y. Laws 1009 (authorization to invest in certain
industrial bonds).
2 See ch. 369, § 239, [1914] N.Y. Laws 1379. Eventually the legal list embraced nearly
all major types of investment securities. Prior to its repeal in 1970, the list included the
following classes of permissible investments:
1) Obligations of the United States or those for which the faith of the United States
is pledged . . . . Ch. 952, § 11-2.2(a)(1)(A), [1966] N.Y. Laws 2859.
2) Farm loan bonds. . . issued by federal land banks; federal intermediate credit
bank debentures . . . issued by federal intermediate credit banks; collateral trust
debentures issued by the banks for cooperatives including consolidated collateral
trust debentures; and bonds, debentures, consolidated debentures or other obliga-
tions of any federal home loan bank or banks or of the federal national mortgage
association. Id. § 11-2.2(a)(1)(B), [1966] N.Y. Laws 2859.
3) Obligations of [New York] issued pursuant to the authority of any law of [New
York], and obligations of any city, county, town, village, school district, poor
district, or fire district in [New York] . . . Id. § 11-2.2(a)(1)(C), [1966] N.Y.
Laws 2860.
4) Obligations of any state other than New York, or of any territory of the United
States, and obligations. . . of any city, county or other political subdivision of any
state of the United States other than New York. . . . Id. § 11-2.2(a)(1)(D), [1966]
N.Y. Laws 2860.
5) Obligations of any revenue or tax supported authority . . . created under the
laws of any state . . . or under the laws of the United States ... ..Id. § 11-
2.2(a)(1)(E).
6) Obligations of the Dominion of Canada. . . . Id. § 11-2.2(a)(1)(H), [1966] N.Y.
Laws 2861.
7) Obligations of any province of the Dominion of Canada . . . . Ch. 686, § 123,
[19671 N.Y. Laws 1750.
8) Bonds and mortgages. . . on unencumbered real property in [New York]. ...
Id. § 124.
9) Deposits in the special interest or thrift department of [commercial banks] in
[New York] . . . or deposits in savings banks incorporated under the laws of [New
York]. Id., at 1751.
10) Shares of federal savings and loan associations located in [New York] . . . or
of [New York] savings and loan associations . . . . Ch. 515, § 1, [1968] N.Y. Laws
1877.
11) Bonds, notes and other obligations of a public housing authority or agency
located . . . in New York . . . . Ch. 952, § 11-2.2(a)(1)(M), [1966] N.Y. Laws
2862.
12) [O]ther securities of corporations organized and existing under the laws of the
United States. . . or of any state of the United States. . . [with certain qualifica-
1977]
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chase of other securities, including common and preferred stock, but
such investments could not exceed thirty-five percent, and later
fifty percent,2" of the value of the entire trust fund."
In response to mounting criticism," New York abandoned the
rigid and perhaps arbitrary legal list and statutorily adopted the
prudent man rule,29 which presently is codified in section 11-2.2 of
the Estates, Powers and Trust Law (EPTL) .3 This statute permits
a fiduciary holding investment funds on or after May 1, 1970 to
purchase any security that "would be acquired by prudent men of
discretion and intelligence in such matters who are seeking a reason-
able income and preservation of their capital," provided that such
tions]. Ch. 952, § 11-2.2(a)(1)(0), [1966] N.Y. Laws 2862, as amended by, ch. 686,
§ 125, [1967] N.Y. Laws 1751, and ch. 567, § 1, [1968] N.Y. Laws 1977.
13) Nothing . . . shall limit the effect of any will, agreement, court order or other
instrument creating or defining the investment powers of a fiduciary. . . . Ch. 952,
§ 11-2.2(a)(1)(P), [19661 N.Y. Laws 2864.
See 9C ROHAN, supra note 15, at 11-2.2[2] n.27.
Ch. 901, § 1, [1965] N.Y. Laws 2114.
27Ch. 464, § 1, [1950] N.Y. Laws 1203.
" It was felt that New York beneficiaries and remaindermen were unjustifiably placed
at a comparative disadvantage due to the retention of the restrictive legal list. See Memoran-
dum of State Department of Banking, reprinted in [1970] N.Y. Laws 2903, 2904 (McKin-
ney); TEMPORARY STATE COMM'N ON THE MODERNIZATION, REVISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE
LAW OF ESTATES, FOURTH REPORT, N.Y. LEG. Doc. 19, at 539-45 (1965). See generally Barclay,
Prudent Man Rule Developments, 100 TRUSTS & EST. 459, 459 (1961); Friedman, supra note
2 at 567-71; Ward & Schockney, The Texas Trust Act: Investment Power of a Trustee, 37
TEx. L. REv. 66, 70 (1958).
Since the 1940's, the trend clearly has been to abandon the legal list in favor of statutes
containing the prudent man rule. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227, Comment p (1959);
G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 106, at 388-89 (5th ed. 1973); Scott, The Law
of Trusts, 1941-1945, 59 HARv. L. REV. 157, 180 (1945). Indeed, most jurisdictions now have
incorporated the prudent man rule into their statutory framework. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 737.302 (West 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 148, § 105 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); N.Y. EST.,
POWERS & TRUST LAW § 11-2.2(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 7302(b) (Purdon 1975); WASH. REV. CODE § 30.24.020 (1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 881.01 (West
Spec. Pam. 1977).
- Ch. 321, §§ 1-2, [1970] N.Y. Laws 1694. An explanation of the workings of the prudent
man rule is contained in the memorandum of the New York Department of Banking filed in
support of the legislation:
The prudent man rule is not a license to speculate. Instead, it applies the
ultimate test of prudence to each investment. This rule served well in Massachu-
setts for 135 years and for shorter periods in 30 other states, while beneficiaries and
remaindermen of New York funds have suffered because of New York's more re-
strictive statutes. It is especially in New York, where financial information and
advice and competent legal advice are readily available, that fiduciaries should be
expected to know or to learn how to invest prudently.
Memorandum of State Department of Banking, reprinted in [1970] N.Y. Laws 2903, 2904
(McKinney).
31 N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.2(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977).
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investment is not prohibited by "any will, agreement, court order
or other instrument creating or defining the investment powers of a
fiduciary." '3'
THE PRUDENT MAN RULE IN NEW YORK
The wording of EPTL section 11-2.2 is similar to the language
employed by the Harvard College court in enunciating the prudent
man rule.32 Although returning to the prudent man rule may appear
a step backwards, that principle is a modern and dynamic standard
by which a fiduciary may guide himself in selecting and retaining
investments and under which courts may evaluate his performance.
By abandoning the legal list and adopting the prudent man rule,
New York has chosen the standard which has proven to be the most
flexible for judging fiduciary performance.13 Indeed, the utility of
the prudent man rule lies in its lack of specificity, as this permits
the propriety of the trustee's investment decisions to be measured
in light of the business and economic circumstances existing at the
time they were made.34
In making investment determinations under the prudent man
rule, a fiduciary should consider several factors, including the cur-
rent economic situation, the amount of income to be produced for
the beneficiaries, and the amount of capital in the trust. 5 Addition-
s' Id.
22 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1831). See notes 7-13 and accompanying text supra.
33 As noted by one commentator, "[s]ince the legislature cannot be omniscient, legal
lists cannot be perfect; thus the prudent-man rule seems preferable since it is better able to
adjust to changing market conditions and business practices." Ward & Shockney, The Texas
Trust Act: Investment Powers of a Trustee, 37 TEx. L. Rv. 66, 70 (1958). See Shattuck, The
Development of the Prudent Man Rule for Fiduciary Investment in the United States in the
Twentieth Century, 12 OHIO ST. L. J. 491, 506 (1951).
3, The prudence of a trustee's investment decision is measured according to the prevail-
ing economic circumstances at the time of the investment, without regard to subsequent
market events. In re Clark, 257 N.Y. 132, 136, 177 N.E. 397, 398 (1931); cf. New York Credit
Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc., v. Weiss, 305 N.Y. 1, 12, 110 N.E.2d 387, 401 (1953) (Des-
mond, J., dissenting); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Fisk, 244 App. Div. 200, 204, 278 N.Y.S. 809,
813 (lst Dep't 1935), aff'd mem., 270 N.Y. 550, 200 N.E. 312 (1936). See also G. BOGERT,
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 541, at 447 (2d ed. 1960).
1 More specifically, a trustee should examine:
(1) the marketability of the particular investment; (2) the length of the term of the
investment, for example, the maturity date, if any, the callability or redeemability,
if any; (3) the probable duration of the trust; (4) the probable condition of the
market with respect to the value of the particular investment at the termination of
the trust especially if at the termination of the trust the investment must be con-
verted into money for the purpose of distribution; (5) the probable condition of the
market with the respect to reinvestment at the time when the particular investment
matures; (6) the aggregate value of the trust estate and the nature of the other
19771
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ally, it should be remembered that the trustee is not authorized to
make or retain trust investments that are speculative, even where
they are of such promise and character that a prudent person might
make them for himself.3" New York courts have held that
[t]he primary object of the creation of a trust is the preservation
and perpetuity of the fund until the purposes of the trust have been
accomplished. This object [would be] endangered and may be
entirely defeated by exposing the estate to the perils of speculative
pursuits which are always subject to the hazard of great loss."
If a trustee, therefore, is to make a choice between income and
safety, he probably should select the safe investment.31 When faced
with investment decisions, the fiduciary may seek advice from other
professionals, but generally the trustee himself must select the in-
vestment .3  Although other jurisdictions hold that the trustee owes
the beneficiary a duty to diversify investments in an effort to de-
crease the possibility of loss,40 in New York diversification is not
investments; (7) the requirements of the beneficiary or beneficiaries, particularly
with respect to the amount of the income; (8) the other assets of the beneficiary or
beneficiaries including earning capacity; (9) the effect of the investment in increas-
ing or diminishing liability for taxes; (10) the likelihood of inflation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 227, Comment o (1959).
31 King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 86 (1869), discussed in notes 14-18 and accompanying text
supra; In re Will of Carnell, 260 App. Div. 287, 290, 21 N.Y.S.2d 376, 379-80 (3d Dep't), aff'd
mem., 284 N.Y. 624, 29 N.E.2d 935 (1940); 3 A. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 227, at 1806 (3d ed. 1967).
37 In re Will of Carnell, 260 App. Div. 287, 292, 21 N.Y.S.2d 376, 381 (3d Dep't), affd
mem., 284 N.Y. 624, 29 N.E.2d 935 (1940); accord, King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 86 (1869); In
re Will of Adam, 3 Misc. 2d 12, 14, 155 N.Y.S.2d 165, 168 (Sur. Ct. Wayne County 1956); In
re Estate of Halperin, 201 Misc. 763, 767, 106 N.Y.S.2d 96, 100 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1951);
In re Putnam's Estate, 42 N.Y.S.2d 367, 368 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1943).
See Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 460 (1831), discussed in notes
7-13 and accompanying text supra; King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 88-89 (1869), discussed in
notes 14-18 and accompanying text supra.
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 227, Comment b (1959), provides that
[t]he trustee does not use due care in making an investment unless he makes an
investigation as to the safety of the investment and the probable income to be
derived therefrom. Ordinarily this involves securing information from sources on
which prudent men in the community customarily rely. He may take into consider-
ation advice given to him by attorneys, bankers, brokers and others whom prudent
men in the community regard as qualified to give advice, but he is not ordinarily
justified in relying solely on such advice, but must exercise his own judgment.
But see In re Fulton Trust Co., 257 N.Y. 132, 177 N.E. 397 (1931) (following advice of busi-
nessmen mere "error of judgment" for which trustee is not liable). See also In re Pinchefski,
179 App. Div. 578, 581, 166 N.Y.S. 204, 205-06 (3d Dep't 1917); In re Haynes, 40 Misc. 500,
82 N.Y.S. 792 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1903).
11 See, e.g., In re Day's Estate, 183 Mass. 499, 67 N.E. 604 (1903); Vest v. Bialson, 365
Mo. 1103, 293 S.W.2d 369 (1956); In re Ward, 121 N.J. Eq. 555, 192 A. 68 (1936); Knox County
v. Fourth & First Nat'l Bank, 181 Tenn. 569, 182 S.W.2d 980 (1944); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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mandatory.' New York courts, to a large extent, have determined
the prudence of a trustee's performance by examining each invest-
ment in question rather than by considering the performance of the
fund portfolio as an entirety." Thus, failure to diversify, in the
absence of other proof of culpable breach of duty, is insufficient to
give rise to liability for loss.43
These general rules are by no means inclusive, but do give a fair
indication of the onerous responsibility which the law places upon
the fiduciary. It is therefore not surprising, particularly in view of
the economic fluctuations of the past years, that many settlors have
turned to banks and trust companies as professional fiduciaries for
expert guidance and management of their trust funds." It appears
OF TusTS § 228, Comment a & Illustration I (1959). See also 3 A. ScOT, THE LAW OF TRusTs
§§ 228, 230.3 (3d ed. 1967).
" See, e.g., In re Beebe's Estate, 52 N.Y.S.2d 736 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1943), aff'd
mem., 268 App. Div. 1051, 52 N.Y.S.2d 796 (2d Dep't 1945) (where trust investments limited
to mortgage participations in two properties such lack of diversity did not as a matter of law
constitute negligence on the part of the trustee); In re Estate of Mendelson, 46 Misc. 2d 960,
261 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sur. Ct. Albany County 1965) (liability of trustee may not be predicated
on failure to diversify); In re Sheldon, 160 Misc. 194, 196 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1936)
(failure to diversify trust does not constitute lack of due care by trustee). But see Cobb v.
Gramatan Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 261 App. Div. 1086, 1086, 26 N.Y.S.2d 917, 919 (2d Dep't
1941) (mem.).
42 See, e.g., In re Bank of N.Y., 35 N.Y.2d 512, 517, 323 N.E.2d 700, 703, 364 N.Y.S.2d
164, 168 (1974); In re City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 189 Misc. 942, 945, 68 N.Y.S.2d 43, 46
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947).
In light of the recent "market fund" investment strategy used by large corporate inves-
tors, New York may have to consider the overall performance of the fund portfolio, as opposed
to individual investments, in determining whether a fiduciary has invested prudently. A
"market" or "index" fund is a portfolio of investments which is a microcosm of a broad
market such as the New York Stock Exchange. Langbein & Posner, The Revolution in Trust
Investment Law, 62 A.B.A.J. 887 (1976). A stock, therefore, which constitutes five percent of
the total value of all listed New York Stock Exchange securities will make up five percent of
the portfolio. The fund is managed under a "buy-and-hold" strategy, which reduces trading
costs since the securities are retained in the portfolio rather than traded in anticipation of
loss or gain. Id. at 888. The market fund strategy is based upon the theory that losses
occasioned by stocks which perform poorly will be offset by gains resulting from those which
perform well. Id. at 889-90.
" See, e.g., In re Kellogg, 35 Misc. 2d 541, 551, 230 N.Y.S.2d 836, 846 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1962); In re First Nat'l Bank, 25 N.Y.S.2d 221, 225 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1941); In
re Gottschalk, 167 Misc. 397, 409 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1938); In re Estate of Young, 159
Misc. 611, 616, 288 N.Y.S. 569, 575 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1936), rev'd on other
grounds, 249 App. Div. 495, 293 N.Y.S. 97 (2d Dep't), aff'd mem., 274 N.Y. 543, 10 N.E.2d
541 (1937); In re Estate of Stupack, 154 Misc. 759, 760, 278 N.Y.S. 403, 404-05 (Sur. Ct. Kings
County 1935), aff'd mem., 248 App. Div. 740, 290 N.Y.S. 151 (2d Dep't 1936), rev'd on other
grounds, 274 N.Y. 198, 8 N.E.2d 485 (1937); In re Estate of Balfe, 152 Misc. 739, 755-56, 274
N.Y.S. 284, 302 (Sur. Ct. Orange County 1934), modified, 245 App. Div. 22, 280 N.Y.S. 128
(2d Dep't 1935); In re Estate of Froelich, 150 Misc. 371, 375, 269 N.Y.S. 541, 546 (Sur. Ct.
Kings County 1934). See note 41 supra.
11 See note 1 supra.
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anomalous, however, that New York law holds the corporate or pro-
fessional fiduciary possessing investment and management exper-
tise to the same standard of care and skill as the nonexpert individ-
ual acting in the same capacity. 5 In the cases in which this question
has been presented, New York appellate courts uniformly have held
that the standard of care required by the prudent man rule is the
same for both expert and amateur. 6 While several decisions have
indicated that a higher standard should be imposed on the profes-
sional fiduciary,47 the implementation of this suggestion has been
viewed as a legislative matter."
ExCEPTIONS TO THE PRUDENT MAN RULE: A HIGHER STANDARD OF CARE
FOR THE PROFESSIONAL FIDUCIARY
Most jurisdictions judge a trustee's investment decisions by the
prudent man standard." The courts of several states, however, have
created a twofold exception to this rule under which a fiduciary is
held to a higher standard when he possesses or represents that he
possesses greater investment expertise than the ordinary man.
"' See, e.g., In re Title Guar. & Trust Co., 291 N.Y. 376, 394-95, 52 N.E.2d 909, 917
(1943); Cobb v. Gramatan Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 261 App. Div. 1086, 1086, 26 N.Y.S.2d
917, 919, (2d Dep't 1941)(mem.); In re Estate of Baker, 249 App. Div. 265, 269, 292 N.Y.S.
122, 129 (4th Dep't 1936); Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Flint, 240 App. Div. 217,
225, 269 N.Y.S. 470, 479 (2d Dep't 1934), aff'd mem., 266 N.Y. 607, 195 N.E. 221 (1935); In
re People's Trust Co., 169 App. Div. 699, 701, 155 N.Y.S. 639, 641 (2d Dep't 1915); In re City
Bank Farmers Trust Co., 189 Misc. 942, 945, 68 N.Y.S.2d 43, 46 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947);
note 3 and accompanying text supra.
" See note 45 supra.
" See Villard v. Villard, 219 N.Y. 482, 502-03, 114 N.E. 789, 794 (1916); In re Estate of
Baker, 249 App. Div. 265, 269, 292 N.Y.S. 122, 129 (4th Dep't 1936); In re Estate of Rockefel-
ler, 46 Misc. 2d 543, 547, 260 N.Y.S.2d 111, 116 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
" See Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Flint, 240 App. Div. 217, 225, 269 N.Y.S.
470, 479 (2d Dep't 1934), aff'd mem., 266 N.Y. 607, 195 N.E. 221 (1935).
"' See TEMPORARY STATE COMM'N ON THE MODERNIZATION, REvISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF
THE LAW OF ESTATES, FOURTH REPORT, N.Y. LEG. Doc. 19 (1965); note 28 supra.
Io See, e.g., Dickerson v. Camden Trust Co., 140 N.J. Eq. 34, 53 A.2d 225 (Ch. 1947),
aff'd, 1 N.J. 459, 64 A.2d 214 (1949) (citing Tannenbaum v. Seacoast Trust Co., 116 N.J.
Misc. 234, 198 A. 855 (1938), afl'd, 125 N.J. Eq. 360, 5 A.2d 778 (1939)); In re Sedgwick's
Will, 74 Ohio App. 444, 59 N.E.2d 616 (1944); Finley v. Exchange Trust Co., 183 Okla. 167,
80 P.2d 296 (1938); In re Estate of Killey, 457 Pa. 474, 326 A.2d 372 (1974); In re Church's
Will, 221 Wis. 472, 266 N.W. 210 (1936). See also 2 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 174.1 (3d
ed. 1967).
The rationale for holding a professional trustee to a higher standard of care is simple,
but compelling. As stated by a California court in In re Estate of Beach, 116 Cal. Rptr. 418
(1974), modified, 15 Cal. 3d 623, 542 P.2d 994, 125 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1975),
[t]he present executor, The Bank of California, was something other than "a man
of ordinary judgment." The bank is a trust company, a professional in its field.
Trust companies solicit business through advertisements and invitations in which
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Pursuant to the first portion of this standard, the "possession of
skill" exception, 51 which has been adopted by the decisional law of
a number of states," a fiduciary is held to a standard of care com-
mensurate with the special skills or expertise that he actually pos-
sesses. This is not a novel concept, but rather is analogous to the
longstanding rules concerning the duty of care owed by professionals
in tort. 3 For example, the law of medical malpractice demands
that a physician specialist use whatever superior knowledge, skill,
and intelligence he possesses, and his actions are judged accord-
they claim greater expertise than individuals. They employ staffs of trust officers,
securities analysts, property managers, accountants and attorneys. . . .A rule of
care phrased for individual executors is inappropriate for measuring the conduct
of trust companies in their executorship role. . .. "A banker, a doctor, a lawyer,
may not gain business as a specialist and [then expect to] defend [their] mistakes
as a layman."
116 Cal. Rptr. at 421 (citations omitted).
The Restatement of Trusts, which has accepted the twofold exception to the prudent
man rule, prescribed that
[the trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to
exercise such care and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing
with his own property; and if the trustee has or procures his appointment by
representing that he has greater skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence, he
is under a duty to exercise such skill.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTS § 174 (1959).
1, The "possession of skill" exception requires a fiduciary having greater skill than the
ordinary individual to exercise the skill which he has and to employ the facilities available
to him. As stated by one commentator, "[i]f [a professional fiduciary] is in a position to
do better than the ordinary man, it is not enough to do what the ordinary man would do." 2
A. Scorr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 174, at 1410 (3d ed. 1967). See also Dickerson v. Camden
Trust Co., 140 N.J. Eq. 34, 53 A.2d 225 (1947), aff'd, 1 N.J. Super. 459, 64 A.2d 214 (1949);
Braman v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 138 N.J. Eq. 165, 47 A.2d 10 (1946). The
trustee does not, however, become "a guarantor of value of securities, and if a failure to sell
or delay in selling resulting in loss is not due to the fault of the trustee, it is not liable to
surcharge." Id. at 186, 47 A.2d at 24.
11 See, e.g., Bryan v. Security Trust Co., 296 Ky. 95, 176 S.W.2d 104 (1943); In re
Schlemm's Estate, 11 N.J. Super. 286, 78 A.2d 156 (1951); Freeman v. Norwalk Cemetery
Ass'n, 88 Ohio App. 446, 100 N.E.2d 267 (1950); In re Jones' Estate, 344 Pa. 100, 23 A.2d 434
(1942); In re Stirling's Estate,342 Pa. 497, 21 A.2d 72 (1941); Gibson County v. Fourth &
First Nat'l Bank, 20 Tenn. App. 168, 96 S.W.2d 184 (1936).
As a general proposition, "one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a
profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by
members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965). See, e.g., Cowles v. City of Minneapolis, 128 Minn. 452,
151 N.W. 184 (1915) (engineer); Calhoun v. Gale, 29 App. Div. 2d 766, 287 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2d
Dep't) (mei.), afl'd mem., 23 N.Y.2d 756, 244 N.E.2d 468, 296 N.Y.S.2d 953 (1968) (sur-
geon); United Dentists, Inc. v. Bryan, 158 Va. 880, 164 S.E. 554 (1931) (dentist); Ward v.
Arnold, 52 Wash. 2d 581, 328 P.2d 164 (1958) (attorney).
" See, e.g., Hopkins v. Heller, 59 Cal. App. 447, 452, 210 P. 975, 976 (1922); Adkins v.
Ropp, 105 Ind. App. 331, 334-35, 14 N.E.2d 727, 728-29 (1938); Rule v. Cheeseman, 181 Kan.
957, 965, 317 P.2d 472, 478 (1957); Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 425-26, 94 A.2d 680,
1977]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ingly.54 A specialist, therefore, may be adjudged negligent in in-
stances where a general practitioner would not be held liable.5
Similarly, the second portion of this judicial exception to the
prudent man standard, the "representation of skill" rule, is not a
new legal concept, but is akin to the standard applied to an agent
who procures employment by representing that he possesses special
knowledge or skill." Under this rule, "[i]t would seem that the
trustee may incur a liability even though he exercises the care and
skill of the ordinary prudent man, and even though he exercises all
the skill he has, if he has" procured his appointment as trustee "by
representing that he has a higher degree of skill."57
Common Law Adoption of a Higher Standard of Care
As early as 1936 courts recognized the logic of requiring profes-
sional trustees to utilize their expertise in managing the funds en-
trusted to them. In the Wisconsin case of In re Church's Will,5" a
corporate trustee was subjected to a surcharge for failing to present
for payment bonds which had been called prior to maturity.59 Not-
ing that professional trustees often are appointed because "they are
considered better qualified for managing trust estates and invest-
ments .... "" the court held that the trustee was not excused from
683 (1953); Toth v. Community Hosp., 22 N.Y.2d 255, 262, 239 N.E.2d 368, 372, 292 N.Y.S.2d
440, 447 (1968); Atkins v. Clein, 3 Wash. 2d 168, 170-71, 100 P.2d 1, 2-3 (1940). See also W.
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 163 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
299A, Comment d (1965); McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L.
REv. 549, 566 (1959).
See authorities cited in note 54 supra.
5 See F. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT § 145 (2d ed. R. Powell
1924); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379(1), Comment c (1958). See generally 16 U.
CHI. L. REv. 579, 579-84 (1949); 21 VILL. L. REv. 151 (1975).
11 2 A. SCOTT, TRUSTS § 174, at 1411 (3d ed. 1967); see G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
§ 541, at 456-57 (2d ed. 1960).
221 Wis. 472, 266 N.W. 210 (1936).
51 Id. at 479-86, 266 N.W. at 213-16. In Church, the property in question consisted of
bonds with a par value of $1000. Id. at 474, 266 N.W. at 211. The bonds recited that the issuer
could redeem them at any time prior to maturity, provided that notice of intent to redeem
was published at least once a week for 3 weeks in a local newspaper of general circulation.
Id. at 476, 266 N.W. at 212. A premium of one percent of the value of the bonds was to be
paid on all bonds so redeemed. Id. at 474, 266 N.W. at 212. Although three notices of a call
for redemption were published in a local newspaper, the Church trustee did not learn of the
call until it was too late to redeem the bonds. Id. at 478, 266 N.W. at 213. The trial court
determined that the trustee was liable for the value of the bonds and the one percent pre-
mium. Id. at 478-79, 266 N.W. at 213.
1 Id. at 482-83, 266 N.W. at 215. The court reasoned that corporate trustees, because of
the large volume of business that they handle, are better equipped than other individuals to
manage and keep track of trust account investments. Id. at 482, 266 N.W. at 215.
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its failure to see the published notice of call, as it was required to
keep abreast of the status of securities entrusted to it."1 Thus, in a
factual setting where the ordinary prudent man probably would not
have been held accountable, the professional fiduciary was found
negligent in the exercise of its duty and held liable for the face value
of the bonds.2
More recently, some jurisdictions expressly have adopted the
twofold exception to the prudent man rule. In In re Estate of
Lohm,63 two co-executors of an estate, one of whom was an attorney
inexperienced in estate tax matters and the other, a layman, joined
by a tax lawyer employed by the estate for his expertise in federal
estate tax law, sought to overturn an order reducing the fees charged
the estate by them. 4 The fee reduction was ordered to recoup a
substantial loss suffered by the estate due to late filing of its federal
estate tax return. 5 On appeal, the court held that the parties should
be judged according to the skill they actually possessed; thus, the
tax lawyer was held to the highest standard and the layman to the
lowest.6
The decision in In re Killey"7 illustrates the application of the
representation of skill principle to a corporate trustee. In Killey, the
remaindermen of a deed of trust commenced an action against the
" Id. at 483, 266 N.W. at 215. Although the trustee had examined five of the 22 local
newspapers, the court nevertheless found a breach of the duty of care. Id.
62 Id. at 478-79, 266 N.W. at 213. The Church court did not discuss the potential liability
of a nonprofessional trustee under similar circumstances. Its opinion, however, indicates that
a finding of liability in such a case would have been unlikely. Writing for the court, Justice
Fritz, stated that all trustees are "liable for failure to exercise due diligence and at least
ordinary care" with respect to the assets of a trust. Id. at 479, 266 N.W. at 214. According to
the court, this standard requires "'the exercise of a high degree of fidelity, vigilance, and
ability,'" particularly on the part of a professional trustee who charges fees commensurate
with the high degree of skill it claims to possess. Id. (quoting In re Estate of Allis, 191 Wis.
23, 29, 209 N.W. 945, 947 (1926)). Thus, a private trustee, lacking the skill, facilities, and
manpower of its corporate counterpart, might have been absolved from liability by the
Church court.
440 Pa. 268, 269 A.2d 451 (1970).
Id. at 270-273, 269 A.2d at 453-54.
Id. at 271-72, 269 A.2d at 453. As a result of the tax lawyer's failure to file the return
on time, the estate was unable to take advantage of a favorable federal tax provision relating
to securities valuation. The lower court determined that the resultant loss was in excess of
$35,000. Id., 269 A.2d at 453-54. To compensate the estate, both lawyers were denied attor-
ney's fees, and a claim for over $43,000 in commissions filed by the executors was reduced to
$15,000. Id. at 277-79, 269 A.2d at 456-57.
11 Id. at 273, 269 A.2d at 454. Explaining that a trustee who "has greater skill than. ..
a man of ordinary prudence . . . must be judged according to the standard of a man with
his special skill," the court concluded that the tax lawyer was required to exercise the highest
degree of care, and the nonlawyer the lowest. Id.
'1 457 Pa. 474, 326 A.2d 372 (1974).
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corporate fiduciary, Industrial Valley Bank and Trust Company
(IVB), contending that IVB had breached its fiduciary duty by fail-
ing to properly administer the trust." The remaindermen argued on
appeal that the lower court decision exempting IVB from liability
was erroneous because it evaluated the trustee's performance under
the prudent man rule and did not take into account the special skills
which IVB represented that it possessed. 9
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, finding the issue to be one
of first impression, held that the liability of a corporate trustee
should be assessed in light of the representation of skill made by it.70
In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that a corporate fidu-
ciary holding itself out as having expertise in the handling of trust
investments is under a duty to manage trusts in a manner commen-
surate with its representations. 7'
Statutory Recognition of a Higher Standard of Care
The judicially created possession of skill and representation of
skill exceptions to the prudent man rule have been incorporated into
the Uniform Probate Code,7" which has been adopted by nine states
in the last 5 years.73 The Uniform Probate Code provides that:
[T]he trustee shall observe the standards in dealing with the trust
assets that would be observed by a prudent man dealing with the
property of another, and if the trustee has special skills or is named
1, Id. at 476, 326 A.2d at 374. The remaindermen argued that the trust was mismanaged
in that the trustee had given it little attention during the period from 1948 to 1963. In
addition, it was contended that the trustee had invested the entire corpus of the trust in its
own common trust fund without consulting the remaindermen. While the second claim was
dismissed as meritless, the case was remanded to a lower court for reconsideration of the first
contention. Id. at 476-79, 326 A.2d at 374-75.
Id. at 476-77, 326 A.2d at 374.
70 Id. at 477, 326 A.2d at 375. Prior to Killey, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had
never expressed an opinion concerning the representation of skill exception. The court had
previously held, however, that the actions of a fiduciary who actually possesses greater skill
than the ordinary prudent man must be judged under a heightened standard. See In re Estate
of Lohm, 440 Pa. 268, 269 A.2d 451 (1970); In re Estate of Mastria, 413 Pa. 278, 196 A.2d 653
(1964); In re Stirling's Estate, 342 Pa. 497, 21 A.2d 72 (1941).
7, 457 Pa. at 477-78, 326 A.2d at 375.
72 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 7-302.
" See ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.075 (1972); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-7302 (West 1975); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 15-16-302 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 737.302 (West 1976); IDAHO CODE § 15-7-302
(Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2813 (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-7-302 (Supp. 1975);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-34.02 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-302 (Supp. 1977). Other states
have enacted portions of the Uniform Probate Code, but have omitted article 7 which defines
the standard of care for trust managers. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 524.1-101 to .8-103 (West
1975 & Supp. 1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 91A-1-100 to -6-104 (Supp. 1975).
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trustee on the basis of representations of special skills or expertise,
he is under a duty to use those skills.
74
By its own wording, the Uniform Probate Code has retained the
prudent man rule as the basic measure of a trustee's duties; it places
a higher duty upon only those fiduciaries who either have or profess
to have greater skill. This approach is identical to that of the states
which have adopted a higher standard of care by means of decisional
law. In application, it does not demand that the professional trustee
perform above his ability, but merely requires that he utilize the
skills which he possesses or claims to possess.7
5
CONCLUSION
The rationale for imposing a higher duty of care upon the pro-
fessional is logical, reasonable, and compelling; yet, it has not been
accepted in New York. There is no reason why a fiduciary should
not be required to exercise all the skill and prudence which he
actually has or professes to have. A settlor naturally assumes that
the trustee will use all the skill he possesses. Indeed, prior to opening
his trust account, the settlor may have been guided past a staff of
financial analysts who are supplied with sophisticated research
data, equipment, and support personnel, and assured that these
individuals would devote their energies to managing and maintain-
ing his investments. 76 The settlor and his beneficiaries do not expect
such self-proclaimed experts to be able to gain business as special-
ists and then be permitted to "defend [their] mistakes as" lay-
men.
77
7, UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 7-302.
7 As noted in In re Estate of Killey, 457 Pa. 474, 481, 326 A.2d 372, 376 (1974), the
established rule is that a professional trustee is not an insurer; he may only be surcharged
for actual loss of principal and income caused by his lack of skill and care. See, e.g,, Hardy
v. Hardy, 217 Ark. 296, 230 S.W. 6 (1950); Pank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 314 Ill. App.
53, 40 N.E.2d 787 (1942); In re Smith's Estate, 228 Iowa 47, 289 N.W. 694 (1940); Woodruff
v. Freehold Trust Co., 112 N.J. Eq. 405, 164 A. 411 (Ch. 1933), aff'd, 116 N.J. Eq. 597, 174
A. 707 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934); In re Estate of Baker, 249 App. Div. 265, 292 N.Y.S. 122 (4th
Dep't 1936); In re City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 189 Misc. 942, 68 N.Y.S.2d 43 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1947); In re Juilliard's Will, 171 Misc. 661, 13 N.Y.S.2d 315 (Sur. Ct. Orange
County 1939), aff'd, 259 App. Div. 828, 19 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (2d Dep't 1940).
"' As the advertisement of Industrial Valley Bank and Trust Company stated:
[The settlor] can relax in the certainty that our investment is both constant and
alert. [A settlor] no longer need be concerned about trying to keep up with fast
moving market and financial developments. What has been [his] part-time worry
is assigned to us as a full-time job on [his] behalf.
In re Estate of Killey, 457 Pa. 474, 482, 326 A.2d 372, 377 (1974).
" In re Estate of Beach, 116 Cal. Rptr. 418, 421 (1974), modified, 15 Cal. 3d 623, 542
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By reaching into the past and adopting the economically re-
sponsive prudent man rule, New York has taken a major step for-
ward. The flexibility of the prudent man rule should prove satisfac-
tory to both the fiduciary, who must make investment decisions
under current economic conditions, and to the courts, which must
judge these decisions. In its present application in New York, how-
ever, the rule completely ignores the needs of the individuals it was
meant to protect, namely, the settlor and his beneficiaries. This
inadequacy may be corrected by holding the professional fiduciary
to a standard of care commensurate with his actual or claimed
expertise. Such a rule already has been adopted in other jurisdic-
tions, either through the common law process or by statutory enact-
ment. Since the courts of New York have not accepted this neces-
sary adjunct to the prudent man rule, perhaps it is time for the
legislature to review this area and enact a statute imposing a more
rigorous duty upon the professional trustee. This solution is consis-
tent with the interests of the fiduciary, the courts, the settlor, and
the beneficiaries.
P.2d 994, 125 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1975) (quoting Coberly v. Superior Court, 231 Cal. App. 2d 685,
689, 422 Cal. Rptr. 64, 67 (1965).
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